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O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 This appeal comes to us from Multidistrict Litigation 
case number 875 (“MDL 875”), otherwise known as the 
“Asbestos MDL,” involving asbestos cases from around the 
country, pending before Judge Robreno in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  The 
District Court, overseeing several thousand asbestos cases, 
dismissed the claims of twelve Plaintiffs
1
 pursuant to Rule 
41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure based on non-
compliance with the District Court‟s Administrative Order 
No. 12 (“AO 12”).  Specifically, Judge Robreno determined 
that the Plaintiffs‟ submissions were fatally flawed in that 
they failed to include specific histories of Plaintiffs‟ exposure 
to asbestos.  Plaintiffs contend on appeal, as they did in the 
District Court, that AO 12 did not impose this requirement, 
and urge, alternatively, that even if it did, under a proper 
balancing of the factors we outlined in Poulis v. State Farm 
Fire and Casualty Company, 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), 
dismissal with prejudice was not warranted.  For the reasons 
                                              
1
The twelve Plaintiffs involved in the present appeal are 
represented by Cascino Vaughan Law Offices (“CVLO”), 
who serve as counsel in approximately two thousand cases 
still pending in MDL 875.  App. at 19-20.  The CVLO cases 
represent the second largest land-based group of cases to 
remain in the litigation.  Id.  
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discussed below, we will affirm the District Court‟s dismissal 
of the twelve cases at issue. 
 
I.  Background 
 
 The present cases – as well as several thousand others 
– were transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 
1991 as a result of a centralization of all asbestos-related 
cases, as ordered by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation.  See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 
771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991).  The Panel found that 
centralization would “best serve the convenience of the 
parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient 
conduct of this litigation.”  Id. at 417.  MDL 875 once 
included more than 150,000 plaintiffs and more than eight 
million claims.  App. at 20.  By the time Judge Robreno 
inherited the MDL in 2009, thousands of cases had been 
settled or otherwise resolved.  Judge Robreno has been 
diligently overseeing the progress and resolution of the 
remaining cases since then. 
 
To streamline the litigation of the thousands of cases in 
MDL 875, the original AO 12 was issued in 2007 by then-
presiding District Judge Giles.  Id. at 5-8.  The purpose of AO 
12, specifically, was to (1) assist the District Court in 
managing the large number of cases and the complex issues 
involved in the litigation; (2) to allow meritorious cases to 
move to trial or settlement properly; and (3) to avoid 
unnecessary burdens on defendants by requiring plaintiffs to 
provide certain medical and exposure information at the 
12 
 
outset of the case.  Id. at 41-42, n.2.
2
  Judge Robreno, with the 
assistance of dedicated magistrate judges, has continued to 
oversee discovery and pretrial procedures, allowing 
meritorious claims to advance and weeding out unsupported 
claims.  See generally Mark A. Behrens, 26 T.M. Cooley L. 
Rev 721, 747-55 (2009) (describing the progress in MDL 875 
and Judge Robreno‟s efforts with respect to discovery, and 
the dismissal of fraudulent claims, especially where there 
were fabricated doctors‟ diagnoses). 
 
A.  AO 12 
In September 2009, soon after MDL 875 was assigned 
to him, Judge Robreno issued an amended AO 12.  App. at 
11-16.  Amended AO 12 required plaintiffs to submit, inter 
alia, medical reports “upon which the plaintiff now relies for 
the prosecution of the claims as if to withstand a dispositive 
motion.”  Id. at 12-13.  Specifically, Amended AO 12 
required that: 
 
Each plaintiff asserting a claim based upon an 
alleged asbestos-related malignancy shall 
submit to the court a copy of the medical 
                                              
2
See also Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., No. L-33606-85, 1986 WL 
637507 (N.J. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 1986) (entering a pretrial 
order that required plaintiffs to provide facts in support of 
their claims through expert reports or risk having their cases 
dismissed); Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 
(5th Cir. 2000) (noting that Lone Pine case management 
orders “are designed to handle the complex issues and 
potential burdens of defendants and the court in mass tort 
litigation”).   
13 
 
diagnosing report or opinion upon which the 
plaintiff now relies for the prosecution of the 
claims as if to withstand a dispositive motion. 
 
Each plaintiff asserting a claim based upon an 
alleged non-malignant injury or condition shall 
submit to the court a copy of the medical 
diagnosing report or opinion upon which the 
plaintiff now relies for the prosecution of the 
claim as if to withstand a dispositive motion.   
 
Each report or opinion submitted hereunder 
shall be based upon objective and subjective 
data which shall be identified and descriptively 
set out within the report or opinion. 
 
Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).
3
   
 
Finally, Amended AO 12 (hereafter “AO 12”) 
provided that “[t]he court may dismiss pursuant to F.R.C.P. 
41(b) the cases of any plaintiffs who fail to comply with the 
requirements set forth.”  Id. at 14. 
 
                                              
3
Some cases were supported only by medical diagnoses that 
were the results of “mass screenings.”  With respect to those 
cases, AO 12 stated that “mass screenings create an inherent 
suspicion as to their reliability,” and that “[t]his court will 
therefore entertain motions and conduct such hearings as may 
be necessary to resolve questions of evidentiary sufficiency in 
non-malignant cases supported only by the results of mass 
screenings which allegedly fail to comport with acceptable 
screening standards.”  App. at 14. 
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B.  November 2011 Order 
 
On November 14, 2011, Judge Robreno issued an 
order dismissing forty-seven CVLO cases for failure to 
comply with AO 12 (“November 2011 Order”).  App. 19-39.  
Of those cases dismissed, nineteen were dismissed for failure 
to provide sufficient AO 12 reports with respect to exposure 
history and twenty-four cases were dismissed for failure to 
show an asbestos-related impairment.  Id. at 29-39.  In the 
November 2011 Order, Judge Robreno referred to the six 
Poulis factors that a court should consider before dismissing a 
case pursuant to Rule 41(b).  Id. at 21-22.  
 
Although the plain language of AO 12 does not state 
that plaintiffs must provide a complete exposure history, the 
District Court based its dismissal of cases that failed to 
include such information “on the language in AO 12 that 
emphasizes that plaintiffs should submit medical diagnosis or 
opinions based on medically accepted principles and 
practices, and based on statements from reputable medical 
organizations that require occupational and environmental 
exposure history when screening for asbestos-related 
diseases.”  Id. at 33.  Accordingly, the District Court required 
AO 12 submissions to comply with “generally accepted 
medical standards [that] call for information regarding 
duration, intensity, time of onset, and setting of exposure to 
asbestos.”  Id. at 31 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).   
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Furthermore, the District Court interpreted AO 12 to 
require “the medical evidence presented by Plaintiff [to] 
contain a diagnosis of a symptomatic asbestos-related 
disease.”  Id. at 34.  The District Court therefore dismissed 
claims that were supported by AO 12 submissions that 
included only diagnoses of pleural plaques and pleural 
thickening.  Id. at 34.   
 
C. Rule 41(b) Motions to Dismiss and March 
2012 Order 
 
 A series of Rule 41(b) motions to dismiss the cases 
before us on appeal were filed between October 28, 2011 and 
December 28, 2011, in which Defendants argued that – 
considering the District Court‟s November 2011 Order – the 
claims must be dismissed for failure to comply with AO 12.
4
  
                                              
4
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states 
that: 
  
[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute 
or to comply with these rules or a 
court order, a defendant may 
move to dismiss the action or any 
claim against it. Unless the 
dismissal order states otherwise, a 
dismissal under this subdivision . . 
. operates as an adjudication on 
the merits. 
 
A Rule 41(b) dismissal may be entered sua sponte or on 
motion of a party.  Pickel v. United States, 746 F.2d 176, 182 
16 
 
Plaintiffs submitted briefs in opposition to Defendants‟ 
motions, arguing that AO 12 did not require complete 
exposure history, and alternatively, that dismissal was not 
warranted under Poulis.  At no point did Plaintiffs offer 
supplemental AO 12 submissions with more complete 
exposure histories.   
 
After Defendants submitted their motions to dismiss 
and Plaintiffs filed their opposition, the District Court issued 
an Order on March 12, 2012.
5
  The District Court dismissed 
Arendt, Brix, and Burzynski for failure to show an asbestos-
related disease.  App. at 50.  The District Court also 
dismissed Arendt and Brix as to Defendant General Electric 
because Plaintiffs failed to serve the AO 12 submissions on it.  
Id. at 48.  The District Court dismissed Stafford, Michels, 
Ostrand, Wright, Zerbel, Hansen, Morris, Repischak, and 
Duffey for failing to provide a sufficient history of asbestos 
exposure.  Id. at 45-47.  In the March 2012 Order, the District 
Court adopted its reasoning in the November 2011 Order, and 
also noted that “[w]ithout evidence of an exposure history for 
each plaintiff and a medical diagnosis that allows defendants 
and the Court to sort through, for example, which plaintiffs 
allegedly were exposed to whose asbestos at which locations, 
                                                                                                     
n.7 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 
(1962)). 
 
5
One case in the present appeal, Stafford v. AW Chesterton 
Company, No. 11 Civ. 63497, was dismissed with prejudice 
by Order dated January 3, 2012.  In that case, the District 
Court granted Defendants‟ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 
41(b) “for the reasons outlined in this Court‟s Memorandum 
Opinion of November 14, 2011.”  Doc. No. 240. 
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the litigation of thousands of cases could not go forward.”  Id. 
at 42 n.2.   
 
Plaintiffs‟ timely appeal followed.  Plaintiffs advance 
two arguments on appeal: (1) that the District Court 
incorrectly held that Plaintiffs‟ AO 12 submissions were 
deficient; and (2) that the District Court erred in dismissing 
Plaintiffs‟ cases with prejudice under Rule 41(b) for failing to 
comply with AO 12. 
 
II. Standard of Review 
 We review a district court‟s interpretation of its own 
orders with deference, particularly in the MDL context.  See, 
e.g., Gibbs v. Frank, 500 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We 
review a district court‟s interpretation of its own order for 
abuse of discretion.”); In re Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 
814, 822-23 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (observing, in MDL, that 
“[d]istrict judges must have authority to manage their 
dockets, especially during a massive litigation such as this, 
and we owe deference to their decisions whether and how to 
enforce the deadlines they impose”).6   
 
We review the District Court‟s dismissal pursuant to 
Rule 41(b) for an abuse of discretion.  Emerson v. Thiel 
College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 
                                              
6
Appellants made much of the standard of review in their 
briefs, insisting that the District Court‟s interpretation of AO 
12 should be reviewed de novo.  Appellants did not support 
this argument with case law, however, and largely abandoned 
it at oral argument. 
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III. Discussion 
We note at the outset that these cases were transferred 
to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as a result of the 
centralization of all asbestos-related cases by the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.  The goal of the multidistrict 
litigation process is to “promote the just and efficient 
conduct” of “civil actions involving one or more common 
questions of fact” that are pending in different districts.  28 
U.S.C. § 1407(a); see also In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) 
Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1231 (9th Cir. 
2006) (observing that when similar cases are coordinated for 
pretrial purposes, those cases are more likely to proceed 
toward resolution on the merits with less burden and expense 
overall than if each were litigated separately). 
 
To that end, Judge Robreno has been diligently 
overseeing pretrial procedures in the asbestos-related cases 
since he inherited this MDL in 2009, including issuing 
administrative orders to streamline discovery.  While the 
specific form of MDL proceedings does not alter the 
substantive rights of the litigants, it has nonetheless caused 
courts of appeals to acknowledge the increased burden 
imposed on judges handling these cases, and to consider these 
demands in applying the “abuse of discretion” standard, as we 
discuss more fully below.   
 
We also note that dismissal with prejudice is a drastic 
remedy and we must be assured that it was not ordered 
arbitrarily.  The history of the proceedings leading up to 
dismissal, as discussed above, is therefore very important.    
 
A.  Compliance with AO 12 
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1.  Complete Exposure History 
 Plaintiffs expended much of their energy before the 
District Court urging that the District Court‟s interpretation of 
AO 12, as set forth at length in its November 2011 Order, was 
incorrect for requiring a complete exposure history.  They 
continue to press this argument on appeal.  Plaintiffs insist 
that AO 12 did not require a complete exposure history – 
rather, Plaintiffs contend that indicating the nature and 
duration of a claimant‟s work, as well as general allegations 
of exposure history, should suffice.  See, e.g., App. at 301-14 
(discussing Plaintiff Barry Wright, who “worked primarily as 
a painter in the state of Illinois between the years of 1966 and 
1991” and “has a history of having been exposed to asbestos 
and asbestos dust during the above mentioned period”).   
 
The language of AO 12 is broad.  While this broad 
language could support other interpretations – including the 
one urged by Plaintiffs – we see no reason not to defer to the 
District Court‟s interpretation of AO 12 that requires 
plaintiffs‟ submissions to include asbestos exposure history.  
See DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 844 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(noting that “we normally give great deference to a court‟s 
interpretation of its own orders”); see also Negron-Almeda v. 
Santiago, 528 F.3d 15, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2008) (explaining that 
district court orders are “of considerable import” and that “a 
reviewing court can comb relevant parts of the record to 
discern the authoring court‟s intention”); United States v. 
Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 58-59 (1st Cir. 2001) (“We defer to [the 
district court‟s interpretation its own case management order] 
because the district court was uniquely positioned to explain 
the meaning of its own pretrial order.”).    
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In this case, the District Court resolved any ambiguity 
as to the requirements of AO 12 in its November 2011 Order.  
As detailed in the November 2011 Order, the District Court 
believed that ordering plaintiffs to submit a “medical 
diagnosing report or opinion” that was “based upon objective 
and subjective data which shall be identified and descriptively 
set out within the report or opinion,” App. at 13, meant that 
plaintiffs must include exposure history so as to comply with 
“generally accepted medical standards [that] call for 
information regarding duration, intensity, time of onset, and 
setting of exposure to asbestos,” id. at 31.  Indeed, the District 
Court specifically noted in its November 2011 Order that 
accredited health organizations require exposure history in 
screening for and diagnosing asbestos-related diseases.  For 
instance, as noted by the District Court, the Association of 
Occupational and Environmental Clinics stated that “[a]n 
appropriate screening program for asbestos-related lung 
diseases includes properly chosen and interpreted chest films, 
reviewed within one week of screening; a complete exposure 
history; symptom review; standardized spirometry; and 
physical examination.”  Id. at 32 (emphasis in original; 
citation omitted).  Additionally, the American Thoracic 
Society noted that “[i]t is essential to take a comprehensive 
occupational and environmental history when asbestos-related 
disease is suspected.  The occupational history should 
emphasize occupational and environmental opportunities for 
exposure that occurred about 15 years and more before 
presentation.”  Id. at 33.   
 
Accordingly, based on the language in AO 12 that 
requires plaintiffs to submit medical diagnoses or opinions 
based on objective and subjective data, as well as statements 
from reputable medical organizations that emphasize the 
21 
 
importance of exposure history, the District Court interpreted 
AO 12 submissions to include exposure history.
7
  Although 
the broad language of AO 12 could support different 
interpretations, it does not strike us as an abuse of discretion – 
especially given the District Court‟s experience overseeing 
these proceedings – to require a “complete occupational and 
environmental exposure history when asbestos-related disease 
is suspected.”  Id.  Cf. In re USA Commercial Mortg. Co., 452 
F. App‟x 715, 720 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Indeed, in light of its 
experience overseeing these proceedings, the district court is 
entitled to broad deference in interpreting whether the 
provisions of its own orders have been satisfied.”).   
Presumably, the thousands of other AO 12 submissions for 
cases pending in the MDL are supported by more detailed, 
and thus satisfactory, exposure histories. 
 
Plaintiffs‟ arguments before us track those they made 
before the District Court, and they fare no better here.  
Plaintiffs do not deny that their AO 12 submissions lack 
exposure history.  Rather, they focus their argument on 
insisting that AO 12 did not require what the District Court 
said it did, advancing an argument – relegated to the last 
                                              
7
The District Court clearly believed that this applied to all 
cases; Plaintiffs disagree and urge that requiring a detailed 
occupational and environmental exposure history was 
required only in nonmalignant “mass screening” cases.  While 
reasonable minds might differ as to the clarity of AO 12 on 
this point, it became clear to counsel representing Plaintiffs 
on November 14, 2011 that this was how the District Court 
interpreted the requirements of AO 12.  Indeed, Defendant 
Bechtel, two days later, filed its motion to dismiss the instant 
cases based on that reading. 
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pages of their brief on appeal – that dismissal was not 
warranted and that they should be permitted to amend their 
submissions.  However, Plaintiffs could have supplemented 
their submissions to comply with the District Court‟s 
requirements at any time during the several months before the 
District Court‟s issuance of its March 2012 Order.  No 
amendments were attached to their responses to Defendants‟ 
41(b) motions, nor were amendments ever filed.  Three 
months later, the District Court, consistent with its prior 
order, entered the March 2012 Order dismissing these cases. 
 
Because we cannot conclude that the District Court 
abused its discretion by interpreting AO 12 to require a 
complete exposure history, and because Plaintiffs‟ AO 12 
submissions do not include complete exposure histories, 
Plaintiffs‟ argument fails. 
 
2.  Asbestos-Related Disease 
 The District Court also dismissed the Arendt, Brix, and 
Burzynski cases for failure to show an asbestos-related 
disease as required by AO 12.  The District Court specified 
the meaning of “asbestos-related disease” in its November 
2011 Order.  After surveying state law and doctrinal trends, 
the District Court concluded that plaintiffs whose AO 12 
submissions showed only “pleural plaques and pleural 
thickening, but no „asbestos-related disease‟ or „cognizable 
asbestos-related injury‟” did not satisfy the requirements of 
AO 12.  App. at 34.  Rather, “to satisfy AO 12, the medical 
evidence presented by Plaintiff must contain a diagnosis of a 
symptomatic asbestos-related disease.”  Id.   
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On appeal, Plaintiffs  do not argue that the District 
Court erred in its interpretation of AO 12 in this regard – in 
fact, they concede that the AO 12 submissions in the Brix and 
Burzynski cases did not demonstrate diagnosis of a 
symptomatic asbestos-related disease.  However, Plaintiffs 
argue that the AO 12 submission in Arendt did, in fact, show 
such a diagnosis. 
 
 The AO 12 submission in Arendt included one chest 
scan that suggested “bilateral apical pleural thickening” and 
“small right-sided pleural effusion.”  Id. at 81.  This was, 
evidently, the only medical record submitted in connection 
with the AO 12 submission.  Id. at 81-84.  While Plaintiff 
made other submissions to the “IKON repository” that 
included arguably more thorough diagnosing information, id. 
at 86-145, these documents were not included in Plaintiff‟s 
AO 12 submission. 
 
 Because, as the District Court concluded in its 
November 2011 Order, “pleural thickening” does not satisfy 
AO 12‟s requirement of showing an asbestos-related disease, 
and Plaintiff‟s AO 12 submission discusses only “pleural 
thickening,” the District Court did not err in concluding that 
Plaintiff‟s AO 12 submissions in Arendt, Brix, and Burzynski 
were deficient.
8
   
 
 
                                              
8We need not address Plaintiffs‟ arguments as to dismissal 
against Defendant General Electric, as we conclude that the 
District Court properly dismissed Arendt and Brix for failing 
to comply with AO 12. 
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B.  Dismissal With Prejudice 
 In an apparent last ditch argument, Plaintiffs urge that 
the District Court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs‟ cases with 
prejudice because it did not properly consider the Poulis 
factors.  As stated above, we review dismissals under Rule 
41(b) for abuse of discretion.  Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190.  To 
determine if the District Court abused its discretion in 
dismissing a case under Rule 41(b), we review the manner in 
which it balanced the six factors enumerated in Poulis v. State 
Farm Fire and Casualty Company.   See Ali v. Sims, 788 F.2d 
954, 957 (3d Cir. 1986) (“In determining whether a district 
court has abused its discretion in dismissing a complaint . . . 
we will be guided by the manner in which the court balanced 
the Poulis factors and whether the record supports its 
findings.”).  Those  factors are: (1) the extent of the party‟s 
personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary 
caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond 
to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the 
conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad 
faith; (5) the effectiveness of alternative sanctions other than 
dismissal; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.  
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.  We have required district courts to 
consider these factors because dismissal with prejudice is, 
undeniably, a drastic sanction.  See United States v. 
$8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141, 161 (3d Cir. 
2003) (noting that the district court should have considered all 
six Poulis factors before dismissing claim as a discovery 
sanction).     
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We have noted in the past that there is no “magic 
formula” or “mechanical calculation” with regard to Poulis 
analysis.  Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008).  
In fact, “„no single Poulis factor is dispositive,‟ [and] we have 
also made it clear that „not all of the Poulis factors need be 
satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.‟”  Id. (quoting Ware 
v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003) and 
Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)).  
However, a district court‟s ability under Rule 41(b) “to 
prevent undue delays and to achieve the orderly disposition of 
cases must be weighed against the policy of law which favors 
disposition of litigation on its merits.”  Marshall v. Sielaff, 
492 F.2d 917, 918 (3d Cir. 1974).  While consideration of the 
Poulis factors can help strike that balance, “[n]o precise rule 
can be laid down as to what circumstances justify a dismissal 
for failure to prosecute, but the procedural history of each 
case must be examined in order to make that determination.”  
Id. 
 
With that in mind, it bears noting that district judges 
“must have authority to manage their dockets, especially 
during [a] massive litigation.”  Fannie Mae, 552 F.3d at 823.  
As the Ninth Circuit recognized, “administering cases in 
multidistrict litigation is different from administering cases on 
a routine docket.”  In re Phenylpropalomine (PPA), 460 F.3d 
at 1229.  Accordingly, in complex cases, district courts must 
have wide discretion to manage “complex issues and potential 
burdens on defendants and the court” – namely, as the Fifth 
Circuit recognized, through managing discovery.  Acuna, 200 
F.3d at 340-41 (noting that in case where approximately 1600 
plaintiffs sued over 100 defendants for a range of injuries 
occurring over a span of up to forty years, it was “within the 
court‟s discretion to take steps to manage the complex and 
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potentially very burdensome discovery that the cases would 
require”).   
 
Moreover, the parties‟ compliance with case 
management orders is essential in a complex litigation such as 
this.  In the words of the Ninth Circuit: 
 
Multidistrict litigation is a special 
breed of complex litigation where 
the whole is bigger than the sum 
of its parts. The district court 
needs to have broad discretion to 
administer the proceeding as a 
whole, which necessarily includes 
keeping the parts in line. Case 
management orders are the engine 
that drives disposition on the 
merits.   
 
In re Phenylpropalomine (PPA), 460 F.3d at 1232.  Thus, a 
sprawling multidistrict matter such as this presents a special 
situation, in which the district judge must be given wide 
latitude with regard to case management in order to 
effectively achieve the goals set forth by the legislation that 
created the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 1407(a) (permitting transfers of actions “for the 
convenience of parties and witnesses and [for] just and 
efficient conduct of such actions”).  At the same time, 
efficiency must not be achieved at the expense of preventing 
meritorious claims from going forward.  
 
District courts have analyzed the Poulis factors when, 
as in Poulis itself, it dismisses a case sua sponte, as well as in 
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cases like this, where the plaintiffs were put on notice by a 
motion that dismissal was being sought, and given the 
opportunity to oppose the motion.  We have not previously 
considered whether, and if so how, the two situations may 
differ with respect to the Poulis analysis, but we take this 
opportunity to do so now.   
 
We touched upon the distinction in Briscoe v. Klaus 
when we observed that “it is imperative that the District Court 
have a full understanding of the surrounding facts and 
circumstances pertinent to the Poulis factors before it 
undertakes its analysis.”  538 F.3d at 258.  We warned that 
district courts must “use caution” in using Rule 41(b) to 
dismiss cases sua sponte, “because it may not have acquired 
knowledge of the facts it needs to make an informed 
decision.”  Id.  We found it particularly important for the 
district court to “provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to 
explain his reasons for failing to prosecute the case or comply 
with its orders prior to dismissing a case sua sponte.”  Id. 
 
One way a plaintiff has “a full and fair opportunity to 
be heard regarding his failure to comply with the court‟s 
orders,” id. at 264, is by opposing a defendant‟s motion for 
dismissal under Rule 41(b).  In such a situation, the plaintiff 
has every incentive to “explain his reasons for failing to 
prosecute the case or comply with [the district court‟s] 
orders.”  Id.  The concerns that are present when a district 
court dismisses a case sua sponte without giving the plaintiff 
an opportunity to present arguments against dismissal are 
lessened when dismissal is a result of a fully briefed motion.  
This is particularly true when the district judge has already 
elucidated his interpretation of a case management order and 
has warned the parties that failure to comply with the order 
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could result in dismissal, and especially in the MDL context, 
when the district judge is overseeing several thousand cases.   
 
Keeping these concerns in mind, we will not hesitate 
to remand a case to the district court when the judge 
dismisses a case sua sponte without an indication that Poulis 
was considered.  We have done so in the past.  See, e.g., id. at 
263-64 (“[W]here, as here, the District Court does not have 
the facts necessary to conduct a full analysis of the Poulis 
factors, it is not appropriate for the District Court to dismiss a 
plaintiff‟s case sua sponte.”).  However, we believe we 
should view dismissals following a contested motion 
somewhat differently.  The dismissal here was entered after 
an adversary vetting of its propriety – after a motion and a 
response to that motion – so our approach can be more 
measured, since the parties have had the opportunity to 
present the facts and the arguments.  Here we believe the 
District Court weighed the arguments advanced by the parties 
along the lines of Poulis.  In the context of a massive 
multidistrict litigation, our ability to satisfy ourselves that the 
district court did not act arbitrarily, and did consider the 
relevant factors, is made easier when the dismissal resulted 
from the defendant‟s motion and was challenged by the 
plaintiff before the district court ruled.   
 
Here, Judge Robreno clearly considered the 
applicability of Poulis.  Not only did he discuss the Poulis 
factors in the November 2011 Order, but the parties also 
addressed them fully in their briefs.  While Judge Robreno 
did not explicitly weigh all of the factors in his March 2012 
Order, he signaled his view as to the egregiousness of the 
dilatoriness and prejudice aspects. App. at 41 n.2.   He noted 
that Plaintiffs were essentially holding up the progress of the 
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cases notwithstanding the District Court‟s having issued a 
clear order.  Id.  Moreover, by not coming forth with a 
diagnosis supplemented by a complete exposure history that 
could withstand a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs were 
preventing the District Court from being able to decide 
whether the claims were meritorious.  Cf. Avila v. Willits 
Envtl. Remediation Trust, 633 F.3d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(affirming district court‟s dismissal of several hundred 
plaintiffs in complex environmental litigation where plaintiffs 
failed to comply with district court‟s order to submit 
questionnaire after district court extended deadline several 
times and plaintiffs were warned that the district court would 
dismiss any party who failed to file by the extended 
deadlines). 
 
Once the District Court made clear the way in which it 
viewed the diagnostic information required, counsel – who 
were also counsel to forty-seven plaintiffs whose cases had 
been dismissed pursuant to the November 2011 Order – were 
on notice that their submissions were deficient.  The very 
motions filed by Defendants in this case sought dismissal on 
the basis of the District Court‟s November 2011 Order.  Yet 
Plaintiffs chose the strategy of arguing to the contrary, in 
seeming denial, while the consequences of doing so – in light 
of the dismissals previously ordered in November 2011 – 
were quite clear, and admittedly drastic.   
 
Judge Robreno‟s ruling was not the product of a clash 
of wills in a solitary case. Nor was it precipitous.  It was, 
instead, typical of the interplay of Rule 41(b) in the context of 
the management of multidistrict litigation.  Rule 41(b) is 
intended to allow judges to enforce orders pertaining to the 
progress of their cases.  Nowhere is this more important, in 
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terms of the degree of difficulty and the impact, than in 
multidistrict litigation cases, where the very purpose of the 
centralization before the transferee judge is the efficient 
progress of the cases in preparation for trial.   
 
Here, we have little difficulty concluding that the 
District Court considered and weighed the factors, viewing 
the dilatory and prejudicial aspects as outweighing all others.  
Moreover, as noted above, the flaw in the submissions went 
to the very heart of the “meritorious” aspect, making the 
weighing of that factor impossible.  Thus, we will affirm the 
District Court‟s dismissal with prejudice of the claims in the 
instant appeal. 
 
